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SELF-DRIVING LAWS†
Machines refine and improve products. Artificially intelligent machines will soon
have the same effect on the law. Future developments in artificial intelligence and
machine learning will dramatically reduce the costs currently associated with rules
and standards. Extending this insight, we predict a world of precisely tailored laws
(‘micro-directives’) that specify exactly what is permissible in every unique situation.
These micro-directives will be largely automated. If the state of the world changes, or
if the objective of the law is changed, the law will instantly update. The law will
become ‘self-driving.’ The evolutionary path towards self-driving laws will be piece-
meal and incremental. At first, machine-driven algorithms will merely be used to
guide humans, but, over time, law will increasingly reflect principles and prescrip-
tions developed by machines. We explore three extensions. First, we examine the pos-
sibility that the technology is not merely used to provide information about the state
of the law but is also used as means of command by the state. Second, we ask how
these technological changes will affect contracting behaviour. Third, we examine the
effect of micro-directives on social norms.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, big data, law, future, micro-directives, algo-
rithms, contracts, norms
I Introduction
Machines refine and improve products. Artificially intelligent machines
will soon have the same effect on the law. In this article, we ask how
future developments in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big
data will affect the production of law and the structure of law. We predict
that these new advancements will fundamentally change the way we, as a
society, choose to govern behaviour.
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† We wish to thank Matt Levine at Bloomberg View whose discussions of our previous work
inspired the title and Adam Kolber for comments on an earlier draft.
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We have elsewhere argued that these technological advancements will
lead to the death of rules and standards.1 To be more precise, we have
argued that these advancements will lead to the death of the costs of
rules and to the death of the costs of standards. Rules are clear, but they
are static and rigid. Rules are likely both over- and under-inclusive. They
can be improved by taking into account particular facts of a situation.
Standards are flexible and allow the lawmaker to take into account the
circumstances of a specific case. But standards are judged after the citi-
zen has acted, giving rise to legal uncertainty at the time of action.
Further, subjective biases of human judges may generate legal inconsis-
tency. Standards can be improved by alleviating the uncertainty and in-
forming citizens how to comply with objectively stated laws.
We envision a world where lawmakers use machines to refine the law,
improving on both rules and standards. Ultimately, law will exist in a cat-
alogue of precisely tailored directives, specifying exactly what is permissi-
ble in every unique situation. In this world, when a citizen faces a legal
decision, she is informed of exactly how to comply with every relevant
law before she acts. The citizen does not have to weigh the reasonable-
ness of her actions nor does she have to search for the content of a law.
She follows a simple directive that is optimized for her situation. We call
these refined laws ‘micro-directives.’
These micro-directives will be largely automated. If the state of the
world changes, or if the objective of the law is changed, the vast array of
micro-directives will instantly update. These laws will be better cali-
brated, more precise, and more consistent. The law will become, for all
intents and purposes, ‘self-driving.’
In the first Part of this article, we outline how micro-directives will be
used to govern behaviour in the future. In the second Part, we explore
the likely evolution towards a world of micro-directives. We examine how
reductions in the cost of information will first change human behaviour
and then how the law, over time, will become machine-produced direc-
tives. In the third Part of the article, we explore three extensions: the
possibility of automatic penalties, how technology will change contract-
ing behaviour, and the effect of micro-directives on social norms. A final
Part concludes the article.
1 Anthony J Casey & Anthony Niblett, ‘The Death of Rules and Standards’ (2017) 92
Ind L Rev [forthcoming] [Casey & Niblett].
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II Automated micro-directives
A THE REDUCED COST OF INFORMATION
At the heart of our thesis is information. The cost of information drives
the lawmaker’s choice between using a rule and using a standard. Where
citizen behaviour is frequent and predictable, rules (such as speed lim-
its) are preferable because lawmakers have, ex ante, the necessary infor-
mation to regulate behaviour. Where citizen behaviour is infrequent and
heterogeneous, standards (such as reasonable care) are preferable
because lawmakers can, ex post, take into account additional information
to determine whether the behaviour complies with, or violates, the law.
Technological advances will result in a dramatic reduction in the cost of
acquiring and using information. Such technologies will allow lawmakers
to better predict outcomes and human behaviour. As the differences in
information costs fall away, the distinction between rules and standards will
erode. The lawmaker’s decision between rules and standards will become
unnecessary. A new form of law – the micro-directive – will emerge. The
micro-directive provides ex ante behavioural prescriptions finely tailored to
every possible scenario.
Micro-directives update automatically. If relevant circumstances
change, the micro-directive changes. No longer will we need rigid rules;
the law will adapt to the new environment. Citizens will no longer have
to operate in a world of legal uncertainty, waiting for a judge to deter-
mine whether the behaviour was reasonable. Citizens will be informed
immediately of what is permissible and what is not.
The technological changes will allow the law to be more precise, better
calibrated, more flexible, more consistent, and less biased. The machine-
driven algorithms will allow the law to become self-driving. In the same
way that self-driving cars anticipate the changes in surrounding circum-
stances and provide the optimal response, we hypothesize that laws will
take specific circumstances into account and provide a tailored statement
of what is permissible.
B USING PREDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY TO MAKE LAW
Consider how improvements in prediction – predictive technology – will
foster the rise of micro-directives. Innovations in big data and artificial
intelligence will make it increasingly easy to predict outcomes. The costs
of collecting, storing, processing, and analyzing data will fall. New
machine-learning techniques are outperforming traditional regression
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approaches to prediction.2 Algorithms based on these approaches, using
big data, will form the backbone of precise and finely calibrated laws.
Citizens, armed with an increased power of forecasting, will use predic-
tive technology to assess whether their behaviour complies with the law.
Corporate directors will be able to use predictive technology to assess
whether or not their actions will violate their fiduciary duties to share-
holders. Uber drivers can use predictive technology to determine
whether or not they are independent contractors or employees for tax
purposes. Corporate entities can assess whether a proposed merger will
violate anti-trust laws. Here, compliance information is precise and tai-
lored to each citizen’s particular circumstance.
To some, this is not ‘the law’ but, rather, a description of the law at
one point in time. Critics may be concerned that if these algorithms are
seen as the law, then the algorithms will not change with different states
of the world or take into account special or unforeseeable circum-
stances. But any machine-produced law can be re-calibrated to take into
account new circumstances.
A further concern is that an algorithm will simply entrench biases in
the law. But predictive technology will not just be used to inform citizens
of the existing state of the law. The technology will also be used to
change the contours of the law, improving precision and consistency.
Take, for example, how predictive technology will be used to decide
whether or not to grant bail to a defendant accused of a crime. Currently,
a human judge must weigh many factors, including the seriousness of the
alleged crime and whether the defendant has jumped bail before, and the
defendant’s social and family ties. Based on the information about this
particular defendant, the judge must assess whether the defendant will
skip bail. The decisions of human judges have been shown to be inconsis-
tent across different judges and infused with racial bias.3
Society can improve upon this situation by using analytics of big data
and machine-learning technology. We have millions of observations about
how criminal defendants actually behave once they are granted bail. Why
would we ignore this information? Predictive algorithms give a much
more precise and accurate answer as to whether the defendant will skip
bail. Not only are these algorithms more accurate than human judges, but
they are also more objective, more consistent, and less prone to bias.
2 See e.g. Jon Kleinberg et al, ‘Prediction Policy Problems’ (2015) 105 American Eco-
nomics Review 491.
3 See Shaila Dewan, ‘Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail,’ New York
Times (26 June 2015), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-
the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html>.
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Predictive technologies will fill gaps in the law. Micro-directives will be
available for every hypothetical situation, eradicating the grey area of law.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in a famous contracts case, contended that the
dividing line between an important and a trivial omission resulting in a
breach of a condition ‘cannot be settled by a formula’ and that ‘precise
boundaries are impossible.’4 In the near future, however, predictive tech-
nologies will be used to discerning these boundaries. Deep-learning tech-
nology will find hidden connections in the law, elucidating principles that
do – and, more importantly, should – underpin the law.
Importantly, the new machine-learning techniques will update and
adapt to new situations. These models absorb new information and fac-
tor in new circumstances. In order to better calibrate predictions, evolu-
tionary algorithms in machine learning operate using principles similar
to those used in randomized trials in medicine. Micro-directives, based
on these predictive algorithms, will update automatically as the state of
the world changes. Laws will update automatically. We move towards a
world of self-driving laws.
Human policy makers will still play a crucial role. Just as self-driving cars
will determine the safest and fastest route to a destination selected by hu-
mans, self-driving laws will determine the optimal way to achieve a policy
objective chosen by humans. Even though the micro-directives are auto-
mated and update in real time, human lawmakers will be required to set
the broad objectives of the law. These broad objectives may look like a
standard, but the predictive technology will take the objective and engi-
neer a vast catalogue of context-specific directives for every situation.5
C USING COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY TO BETTER INFORM CITIZENS
Simply having a better calibrated and automatically updating law is not
enough, however, for micro-directives to flourish. These new laws must
also be accessible to citizens. Imagine a ‘rule book’ for doctors that con-
tained micro-directives covering every possible scenario. This rule book
would be enormously detailed but unwieldy. The cost of complying with
such detailed rules would be exorbitant.
This is where communication technology comes in. The cost of com-
municating specific information that updates in real time continues to
fall dramatically. This technology will be able to identify which specific
micro-directive applies to a particular situation and inform the regulated
actor how to comply with the law.
4 Jacob & Youngs, Inc v Kent, 129 NE 889, 892 (NY 1921).
5 For more on the role that human policy makers will play in this new system, see Casey
& Niblett, supra note 1.
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Regulators will be able to provide instantaneous information about
the legality of proposed actions. For example, let us say that an individ-
ual wishes to know whether she is an employee or an independent con-
tractor. Under the current system, the individual may ask the regulator
for an advance tax ruling, by providing all information to the regulator.6
But this process can take weeks or even months. In the near future, pre-
dictive and communication technologies will enable these ‘rulings’ to be
provided within seconds.7
These advancements in prediction and communication will be rein-
forced by other technological advancements in fact gathering and verifi-
cation. As machines get better at gathering and verifying facts, more and
more data will be generated and analyzed. The predictive power will be
further enhanced. These fact-gathering technologies will also improve
the precision of the communicated micro-directive. The micro-directives
will be better tailored as the law-making machines absorb more informa-
tion about particular scenarios.
III The evolution towards self-driving laws
A INCREMENTAL CHANGE
The death of rules and standards will be piecemeal and incremental. An
analogy can be drawn to the evolution of self-driving vehicles. Vehicles
will not suddenly shift one day from completely human operated to com-
pletely self-driving. The evolution will progress incrementally. Many
aspects of self-driving vehicles are already standard features in new mod-
els. These features include self-parking, lane keeping, automatic brak-
ing, adaptive cruise control, and accident avoidance.
At first, the technology simply provided drivers with information. In
the 1990s, for example, technology provided drivers with warnings that
they were too close to other parked cars. As this technology became stan-
dard, newer models provided self-parking technology. Similarly, technol-
ogy has been introduced warning a driver that she is not keeping to her
lane. Soon, the driver will be presented with the option of using technol-
ogy to automatically stay in the lane. Over time, with increasing accep-
tance, vehicles will become entirely self-driving.
6 See e.g. Canada Revenue Agency, online: <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/hm/xplnd/
rlng-eng.html>.
7 This mechanism of immediate and definitive responses to what are now considered
grey areas of law, especially in the field of tax, is a common feature of what Benjamin
Alarie calls ‘legal singularity.’ See Benjamin Alarie, ‘The Path of the Law: Towards
Legal Singularity’ (2016) 66 UTLJ 443.
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We predict that the evolution of the law towards micro-directives will
follow a similar pattern. At first, technology will be used to provide gen-
eral information to citizens. Then, with increasing acceptance from citi-
zens and lawmakers, the predictions will become the law. We provide
three examples of how we expect the evolution to play out.
First, consider the example of judges granting bail. A computer-driven
algorithm to predict the likelihood of a defendant skipping bail is
already being used in some jurisdictions in the United States. But this
algorithm has not completely replaced human judges yet. The transfor-
mation will take time. The algorithm is currently used to provide human
judges with a better forecast of the risk of flight. Soon, we imagine, the
algorithm will provide recommendations as to how the judge should
decide. These recommendations could be followed or ignored by the
human judge. Yet, as more information is generated, and the evolution-
ary algorithm updates and becomes a better forecaster, we imagine that
judges will increasingly rely on the advice of the algorithm. Over time,
with increased acceptance, the algorithm will become the law. The algo-
rithm will effectively replace the judge.
Second, consider how the law of medical malpractice will begin to mir-
ror predictive machine-driven algorithms. Initially, these predictive algo-
rithms will simply provide information, perhaps outlining the likelihood
of adverse outcomes if a particular action is taken. Over time, however,
the machines will provide recommendations on how to best proceed or
warnings on how not to proceed. As these recommendations and warn-
ings become increasingly accurate, and doctors increasingly rely on pre-
dictive algorithms to guide their practice, the algorithms will become
enshrined in the law. In the same way that it would be negligent for a
doctor to ignore an x-ray today, it will become negligent to ignore the
advice of the machine. Over time, the algorithm will become the law of
medical malpractice.
Third, consider how regulators may use the technology to provide the
law directly to regulated actors. A tax regulator could, for example, use
machine-learning programs to automatically process questions of tax resi-
dency. Predictive programs would analyze how judges have resolved these
questions in the past and would allow the regulator to process questions
asked of them by taxpayers. As the regulator becomes more confident in
the automated responses, the technology will be made available to tax-
payers directly. Taxpayers would receive instantaneous legal advice about
their affairs. Again, over time, the algorithm becomes the law.
These three examples illustrate the incremental nature of the evolu-
tion of the law away from rules and standards and towards automated
micro-directives. The speed of the change will depend on the type of
law. The evolution will likely be fastest where the costs both of legal
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uncertainty and of poorly calibrated laws are high. Such costs are likely
greatest in commercial fields such as tax, corporate law, securities, and
anti-trust. The pressure to automate laws will be strongest in these
spheres. The push towards automation will also be greater where data
is already abundant (for example, granting bail) and where the law is
more inherently stable. The principles underpinning the law of
whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee for tax
purposes have remained relatively stable in Canada for years, but, de-
termining whether particular laws violate the protection of freedom of
expression in section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms may, initially, prove more difficult for a machine-driven predic-
tive algorithm.8
B HUMAN SCEPTICISM
The incremental and piecemeal nature of the evolution towards micro-
directives is not simply a matter of feasibility. While some predictive al-
gorithms may take some time to update and improve, there are other
barriers.
Humans are sceptical creatures. In the same way that driverless cars
are frightening to some, the idea of automated machine-produced law is
also terrifying. How can we trust the machines to get the ‘right’ answer?
How can we trust an algorithm to deliver a law that is just?
Throughout history, humans have held a deep distrust of automated
technology. When automated elevators were first introduced, they also
were scary. Elevators had for years been ‘driven’ by human operators to
guide them to the right level. When elevators with automatic stopping
were invented in 1900, some people refused to ride them. Automatic ele-
vators were truly terrifying. How can you trust an automated machine to
lift you hundreds of feet above the ground in a tiny metal box? Auto-
matic elevators did not become standard until after the Second World
War because of this scepticism. Today, few in the developed world today
are frightened of automatic elevators. It took time, but we overcame our
scepticism of the technology. As laws become increasingly automated,
we believe the scepticism to machine-produced law will also fade away.
Can a machine actually do the tasks currently performed by legislators,
regulators, judges, and lawyers? Almost everyone thinks his or her profes-
sion is special. Humans instinctively believe that their judgment and rea-
soning is special and that technology cannot replicate or replace their
particular skill. Doctors, teachers, and baseball scouts all believe that
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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they uniquely possess special skills that cannot be automated.9 Lawyers
are no different.10 The belief that the legal profession is special and that
lawyers and judges are immune from displacement by technological ad-
vances hinges on a bias that leads one to believe that only a human can
deliver such wise judgments and decisions.
But human decision makers are flawed and biased. The biases and in-
consistencies found in individual judgments can largely be washed away
using advanced data analytics. The judgment of one human judge is out-
weighed by the wisdom of a decision generated by predictive technology
that takes into account millions of judgments and decisions.11 Even if a
machine-produced law is not perfectly unbiased, as long as it is less
biased than a law produced by individual humans, the result will be net
beneficial. Plus, the decisions generated by the machine will be far more
consistent than human judgments. Finally, even if a machine-produced
law were to entrench biases, reprogramming a machine to correct for
bias will be far easier than reprogramming and de-biasing many human
judges.
C OTHER ROADBLOCKS AND CONCERNS
The rise of micro-directives will bring enormous institutional upheaval
and autonomy concerns that may present additional roadblocks in the
evolution of the law. The death of rules and standards produces a shift
in the balance of our political institutions, greatly diminishing the power
of the judiciary. As the number of cases and controversies litigated falls
and the interpretation of policy becomes unnecessary, the opportunity
afforded to judges to use cases to make policy statements and impact
9 See generally Michael A Bishop & JD Trout, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human
Judgment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 24–53 (humans instinctively deny
or ignore the success of such technology because of deep-seated cognitive biases, such
as overconfidence in our own abilities and judgments). On medicine, see e.g. Samuel
W Bloom, ‘Structure and Ideology in Medical Education: An Analysis of Resistance to
Change’ (1988) 29 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 294. On education, see
Francoise Blin & Morag Munro, ‘Why Hasn’t Technology Disrupted Academics’
Teaching Practices? Understanding Resistance to Change through the Lens of Activity
Theory’ (2008) 50 Computers and Education 475. On baseball scouts, see Michael
Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: Norton, 2003).
10 See Jeffrey M Lipshaw, ‘The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward
a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity’ (2011) 41 Seton Hall L Rev 1; Cass R Sun-
stein, ‘Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning’ (2001) 8 U Chicago L Sch
Roundtable 29 (suggesting that computer programs do not reason analogically the
way humans do).
11 See James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few
and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations (New York:
Anchor House, 2005).
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opinion will diminish. On the other hand, the opportunities for judges
to inject bias and error will also diminish.
The normative concern here raises a separate question about whether
machine-aided algorithms can implement policy objectives. The question
is whether there is an independent branch of government with the power
to question the policy decisions of the ex ante lawmakers. When the law-
makers decide on legislative objectives and parameters for the machine al-
gorithms, do we want a separate branch of government to review these
decisions? If we do, the reduced role of the judiciary is troubling.
There are also broader consequences for individual citizens. Privacy
would no doubt be affected since machines need to gather data about
human behaviour in order to make decisions. The capability of ma-
chines to invade privacy will increase. These concerns are exacerbated
when a government uses the information it gathers in conjunction with
technology to predict future actions by an individual.
Individuals may choose to ignore micro-directives in the same way that
many individuals today choose not to have cell phones and other com-
munication devices. While the micro-directive merely provides informa-
tion about how to comply with the law rather than a command,12 there
are ethical questions of holding individuals liable for laws that may
change rapidly and when individuals are not informed of these changes.
Automated laws also affect human autonomy. Human autonomy may
be increasingly constrained as more and more ethical decisions are
shifted from the purview of flawed humans to consistent machines.
Moral atrophy may ensue. Individual citizens who simply follow rules
and directives may become robotic, mere automatons who fail to appre-
ciate the moral choices that should underlie their actions. The trend
towards micro-directives will be real as the cost of prediction and com-
munication falls. The consequences relating to morality, privacy, and
autonomy should be addressed before micro-directives arrive.
IV Broader implications
In this section, we explore three extensions to our thesis. First, we
explore the possibility that micro-directives are used not merely to pro-
vide information about the law but also to enforce the law. Second, as
the cost of information falls, the cost of contracting will also fall. We
suggest that citizens will increasingly use micro-directives when order-
ing their private affairs. Third, we explore how the falling cost of
12 Later in this article, we discuss how micro-directives might be used as commands.
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information may lead to formal micro-directives replacing informal
social norms.
A AUTOMATIC PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
We have set out a vision of a world where citizens are informed about
the contours of law pertaining to their situation. The micro-directive
merely provides a highly tailored rule, not a specific command. Upon re-
ceiving the micro-directive, the individuals may still elect to violate the
law. For example, upon receiving a micro-directive from a tax regulator
that you are an employee, you may still elect to file your taxes as an inde-
pendent contractor in order to claim more deductions. There will be
some probability that you will not be audited and your violation will
remain unpunished. Similarly, a doctor may receive a micro-directive
that says surgery is not required, but she may disagree with the law. She
may perform the surgery. If the patient is not harmed, the doctor will
suffer no consequences for ignoring the directive. In the language of
Thomas Hobbes, the micro-directive is merely ‘counsel’ rather than
‘command.’13
Let us suppose though that the law-making authorities can impose an
automatic fine or punishment for violating the micro-directive. In this
world of command, fact gathering and verification technologies may per-
mit immediate notification of a violation of a micro-directive. Here, citi-
zens’ actions could attract scrutiny and punishment irrespective of the
ultimate consequences. Penalties could become immediately payable for
individuals not following the micro-directive. A doctor who wishes to per-
form surgery in spite of a micro-directive forbidding surgery would
immediately pay an automatic fine for disobeying the directive. A jay-
walker may have a fine immediately deducted from her bank account.
These fines operate as a price for violating the law. There are benefits of
such policies. Through this mechanism, the machine would learn about
‘efficient violations’ of the law. The evolutionary algorithm harnesses in-
creasing amounts of information from citizens.
Such commands come at a cost. As Frederick Hayek noted in The Road
to Serfdom, ‘commanding people which road to take’ is different to pro-
viding signposts; it is coercion.14 Automatic penalties for violation would
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed by Richard Tuck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996) at 176: ‘Command is where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe not this,
without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followes
manifestly that he that Commandeth pretendeth thereby his own Benefit . . . Coun-
sell, is where a man saith, Doe, or Doe not this, and deduceth his reasons from the
benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.’
14 Frederick A Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge Press, 1944) at 74.
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pose additional ethical questions that will need to be addressed before
the arrival of micro-directives. Would the stigma of illegal behaviour dis-
appear if rich citizens were able to simply pay a fine at the time of act-
ing?15 Should these automatic penalties be different for the rich and the
poor?
A far more dystopian vision is one where lawmakers turn micro-
directives into physical restraints on behaviour. Rather than com-
manding which action should be taken, the individual is restrained
from undertaking actions that do not comply with the law. Instead of
simply telling the doctor that surgery is not the wisest course of action
and that performing surgery will constitute negligence, imagine now
that the medical technology required to perform the surgery is auto-
matically switched off, denying the doctor the possibility of performing
the surgery. From an ethical and policy perspective, the move from
micro-directives to automatic restraint and strict coercion is enor-
mous. While there may be increased compliance and greater certainty,
the costs to individual autonomy would be great. Further, a complete
ban on violations would be deeply inefficient, as it would dull the abil-
ity of a machine-driven algorithm to learn about how well calibrated
the law is.
B MICRO-DIRECTIVES IN CONTRACTS
The improvements in predictive technology will not just change the way
that law is produced by legislators, regulators, and the judiciary. As the
cost of information falls, and the accuracy of forecasts improves, the way
contracts are produced will also change. Currently, contracts are de-
signed to trade off certainty and flexibility. But in a world with greater
certainty about the future, the problems of incomplete contracting will
begin to fade away.
When contracting parties have poor information about future contin-
gencies, parties commonly use vague standards to guide future beha-
viour. Parties use terms such as ‘best efforts’ or ‘reasonable efforts.’ But,
as information about the future state of the world improves, the obliga-
tions of each party can be directed with greater precision. Rules and
standards will give way to extremely precise courses of action. In each
state of the world, the parties will be informed how best to act in order
to preserve the intent of the contract. Contracts will fully specify how
each party should behave in any state of the world.
Micro-directives in contracts do not need to be understood and
agreed to at the time of contracting, however. Suppose that the parties
15 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, ‘A Fine Is Just a Price’ (2000) 29 J Leg Stud 1.
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simply agree to ‘maximize joint surplus’ and agree upon a general prin-
ciple for splitting the dividends. With this guiding principle, a machine-
driven algorithm will be able to automatically update and inform parties
of their obligations as the state of the world changes. The contract that
governs the behaviour of the parties will essentially be self-driving.
The evolution towards self-driving contracts will, of course, not hap-
pen overnight. At first, contracting parties may use information from
predictive technologies to provide better advice on how surplus can be
maximized. As confidence in the results increases and the benefits of
using machine-learning predictions are realized, contracting parties will
increasingly rely on algorithms to provide the guidance on how to
behave. Over time, the algorithms will become the contracts.
This vision of contracting is, from one perspective, a radical departure
from the world of contract law as we know it. Contracting parties no
longer need to assent to the particulars of a contract. As long as parties
agree to the broad vision, an algorithm will fully describe the obligations
of the parties.
But, from another perspective, this is a continuation of the evolution
of contracting that we have witnessed over the past few centuries. As the
length of contracts continues to grow, covering more and more contin-
gencies, the likelihood that all of the parties have read and understand
all of the terms of a contract becomes slimmer. Courts, though, have
held that long, unread contracts are still enforceable, provided the
terms are reasonable. Our vision of micro-directives in contracting sim-
ply extends this principle one step further.
C LAWS AND NORMS
While we have argued that the technologies will enable greater specifica-
tion and precision of the law, we do not necessarily predict ‘more’ law.
Rather, within the spheres of action where we, as a society, have chosen to
govern human behaviour through law, the law will be more efficient and
better calibrated. We have focused on scenarios where micro-directives
replace grey areas of the law. They are simply replacing vague laws with
more certain and better-tailored laws. On this view of the future, the law
will not encroach on, or infiltrate, all aspects of human behaviour. Indeed,
based on one argument, there may be less law since fewer cases will be
litigated.
But given that the cost of producing law is falling, one might expect to
see more formal laws produced. When technologies can prescribe beha-
viour at a low cost, the benefits of using informal mechanisms, such as
social norms, may fade in comparison. As a result, the appropriate
boundaries between formal laws and social norms will change. Indeed,
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one might argue that these technologies will lead not only to the death
of rules and standards but also to the death of norms. There will be no
‘norms’ of driving when all of the vehicles are self-driving. All current
norms will either vanish or be entrenched in the vehicles’ algorithms.
V Conclusion
The exponential growth of technology in the coming years will greatly
reduce the cost of information. This cost reduction will have a deep and
profound impact upon the way that laws are made and communicated
to citizens. In this article, we have suggested that, as predictive technolo-
gies continue to evolve and improve, the law will increasingly reflect
principles and prescriptions developed by machines. Further, technolog-
ical advancements will mean that these laws – micro-directives – will
update automatically.
There will, of course, be scepticism and fear. People will be sceptical
that machines could ever replicate human judgment. And people will,
initially, be frightened of following a law that has been developed by a
machine. But, in the same way that vehicles will soon be self-driving, we
predict that laws, too, will be self-driving.
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